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23/06/04 SPECIAL REPORT: First estimates and projections of potential electoral results of the August 15, 2004, referendum against President Hugo Chavez Frias

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presented by: Norman Antonio Boscan

CONTEXT: the 2004 Recall Referendum

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT:

Using the results of the 2000 election in which the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias participated as a point of departure … and based on the electoral information available to date … we propose the following preliminary approximations:

The estimated number of eligible electors for the Recall Referendum is approximately thirteen million (13,000,000).

Based on the historical Venezuelan voting abstention rate, the rate of abstention oscillates between 40 and 50%. Each one of these estimates sensibly restricts calculations of the number of people who will effectively exercise their right to vote. After subtracting the number of voters corresponding to each one of the projected abstention rates, the number of active voters remaining is:

% Abstention 40% Abstención 45% Abstention 50 % Abstention

Potential number of effective votes remaining from an estimated 13,000,000 voters

7,800,000

7,150,000

6,500,000

Historically, null votes have been cast at a rate of around 5%. In fact, in the 2000 Presidential elections, there were 5% null votes. The number of votes corresponding to this percentage affects the estimates of votes provided in the previous analysis in the following manner:

Null votes They affect the potential votes corrpesonding to a 40% Abstention rate, leaving: They affect the potential votes corrpesonding to a 45% Abstention rate, leaving: They affect the potential votes corrpesonding to a 50% Abstention rate, leaving: 5 % Null Votes 7,800,000 -7 390,000 7,410,000 7,150,000 -8 357,000 6,792,500 6,500,000 -9 325,000 6,175,000

We consider that the hard votes for Chavez have eroded. As a result, from the 3,700,000 voters that were considered hard Chavez votes, one must subtract an erosion that fluctuates 10-30%. If this hypothesis is true, the hard votes for Chavez for the August 2004 elections could be:

Erosion percentage With 10% erosion, the hard votes for Chavez would be: With 20% erosion, the hard votes for Chavez would be: With 30% erosion, the hard votes for Chavez would be: Hard votes for Chavez, less erosion: 3,330,000 2,960,000 2,590,000

Based on measurements from the last two Presidential elections, the opposition appears to maintain a population of approximately 2,500,000 electors, without erosion.

Electoral population by Abstention rates (-) less null votes for each case 40 % Abstention (-) less 5 % Null Votes 7,800,000 -10 390,000 7,410,000 45% Abstention (-) less 5 % Null votes 7,150,000 -11 357,000 6,792,500 50 % Abstention (-) less 5 % Null votes 6,500,000 -12 325,000 6,175,000 Hard votes for Chavez, less erosion: 3,330,000 2,960,000 2,590,000 Hard opposition votes 2,500,000 2,500,000 2,500,000 Total of approximate number of hard Chavez votes plus hard opposition votes 5,830,000 5,460,000 5,090,000 Number of voters not solidly for either Chavez or the opposition (Potential voters (-) less the sum of hard votes for Chavez and the oppositon) 1,580,000 1,332,500 1,085,000

The Bloque del Cambio (Chavez‚) electoral strategy seeks to recover …  in the first place, the hard votes that have eroded … which fluctuate between 325,000 and 390,000 voters; and in the second place, new voters. The first would be difficult, but not impossible, because these votes seem to correspond to the historical electoral wealth of Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS). The second case relies on the special importance of the impact of the missions.

Given the polarization at the current moment, and the weakening of the government‚s action the undecided voters could be distributed 50/50. But in the worst case, with an abstention rate of 40% or less, the undecided could to 50-70% for the opposition and 30% for the Bloque del Cambio (Chavez). Numerically, the fluctuations of 30% represent 474,000 votes, and 70% represent 1,106,000 of the total of 100% (1,580,000).

It‚s critically important not to lose significant numbers of voters in the 60 days remaining before the recall referendum.

The oppositon needs to (a) get more than 3,700,000 votes and (b) get more votes than Bloque del Cambio (Chavez).

This is possible if and only if:

1.1. The abstention rate is between 45% and 40%;

1.2. Chavez doesn‚t recover the hard votes that have eroded;

1.3. The opposition gets 70% or more of the undecided voters;

Technicially, it‚s highly improbable that the opposition will collect enough votes to revoke President Chávez‚ mandate.

A different appraisal could predict a virtual tie or a difference of less than 500,000 votes, but that is a subject for another analysis.

PRELIMINARY INFERENCES:

The campaign workers must prioritize:

Recapturing the voters who have left Chavez, which could represent between 10 and 30% of 3,700,000 voters who were once pro-Chavez (in 2000).

Motivating new voters (youths and the newly registered).

Those who abstain.

Together, these sectors represent between 1,000,000 y 1,600,000, exactly equivalent to the undecided voters.

RATIONALE: These data:

Must guide the electoral, communications, and organizational strategies.

Present as an “unknown dimension‰ the number of new voters who might sign up in the Identity Mission (voter registration).

Imply that the personnel registered in the missions are made up of a hard pro-Chavez segment, new voters, the undecided, and opposition. Therefore, the missions play a strategic role in the electoral dynamic.

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