| The 'Split' William Bowles (26/08/03) | |
Part One: Out of the horses mouth My contention that the leading expressions of contemporary capitalism has split into two major factions has raised some hackles amongst the coms, so Id like to explore the idea further and try and illustrate why I think the split represents if not a fundamental parting of the ways, then at least the potential for one, especially in the context of the development of a socialist alternative. But first, Id like to present what the ruling elite of the USUK has to say on the subject of the split, as I think its instructive to see how the USUK strategists view the direction the EU is taking. I have made the two essays from which Ive drawn the following extracts available on this site, as I believe they are an invaluable guide to the new imperialist thinking. There is much in the essays especially Kagans that is pure garbage and right out of the neo-con cesspit and part of the rationale advanced by the Bush clique for making war on the world. However, the central thesis, namely how to get the Europeans back on board the imperialist bandwagon, is what concerns me here. The new liberal imperialism by Robert Cooper and, Coopers world of Double Standards "The second half of the twentieth Century has seen not just the end of the balance of power but also the waning of the imperial urge: in some degree the two go together. A world that started the century divided among European empires finishes it with all or almost all of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French , British and finally Soviet Empires are now no more than a memory . The postmodern system in which we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has become a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages." Cooper goes on to say, "The EU is the most developed example of a postmodern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence. The EU is more a transnational than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central power." And in the context of the present crisis, he says, "Within the postmodern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world , following Clausewitz' dictum war is an instrument of policy in the postmodern world it is a sign of policy failure. But while the members of the postmodern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats." But the following statement (which I have used several times in the past) sums up what I believe is the core of Coopers thinking, "The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state." Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: the Kagan thesis "In the maelstrom of transatlantic relations unleashed by the present Iraq crisis, one question goes begging: Is there a middle path between the increasingly pacifist, Kantian worldview of Europe and the increasingly belligerent Hobbesian worldview of the US, a workable compromise between Europe's suspicion of power and faith in an international legal order, on the one hand, and America's belief in power and suspicion of international legal order, on the other? The answer, if there is one, might be found in Britain and in the person of Tony Blair." And in line with Coopers notion of the jungle out there (where the failed states live) and where the other half of double standard operates, Kagan has this to say, "The majority of Blair's critics today judge him strictly by whether he successfully impedes Bush's march to war. But, of course, that is not and never has been Blair's purpose. The prime minister is one of the few leaders in Europe and the UK to comprehend fully the most dangerous phenomenon of the new era, the potential nexus between international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction . Blair has engaged in a two-fold mission. One part of his strategy, and the part that has received the most attention in Europe, has been to try to convince the wary American hyperpower to play by the rules when it turns to force, to act as much as possible within the constraints of the international legal order that Europeans value so highly. But the other, equally important part of Blair's strategy has been to convince Europe to behave responsibly and courageously in a still dangerous world, to acquire the military capacity, and the will to use military force, as essential to the defence and promotion of that same international legal order. Kagan goes on to say, "The theoretical basis for Blair's approach to Europe has been set forth most powerfully by Robert Cooper, once a top official in the Foreign Office. A year ago, Cooper wrote that although "within the postmodern world [ie, today's Europe], there are no security threats in the traditional sense," nevertheless, throughout the rest of the world - what Cooper calls the "modern and pre-modern zones" - threats abound." And finally, we have as it were at the end of his essay his parting shot when he voices his real fear of the direction post-modern Europe is taking, "Blair's problem, in short, has not been his inability to influence the US. It is has been his inability to influence France and Germany. And the risk in Blair's strategy is not that he has placed his fate in the hands of George W Bush - it is that he has also placed his fate in the hands of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder." We can take some of what Kagan says with a pinch of salt, but I contend that what both Cooper and Kagan have to say, is but one facet of my argument that the split is not only real but that underlying all the jargon about post-modernism, Kant versus Hobbes etc, there lies an even more fundamental rationale at work. The legacy and the inheritance "Britons and Europeans are fond of saying that they have lived with terrorism for decades. Fair enough. But the kind of terrorism they have known is not the kind that struck the US on September 11, 2001, the kind that kills thousands in a single strike. Americans today can imagine terrorism on a cataclysmic scale, and so they can imagine a man like Saddam some day slipping biological or chemical or nuclear weapons to a terrorist organisation. Many Britons and Europeans go to great lengths to avoid imagining the imaginable." Although Kagan dismisses the history of Europe as being irrelevant to the current situation, this is pure disingenuity on Kagans part as it doesnt fit into his thesis. The rest of the world has long lived with the death of thousands (in fact tens and hundreds of thousands!) "in a single strike including virtually all the countries of Europe. Frankly, what he has to say on this score is pure bullshit, but then the guy is from Mars. There are two major aspects that I believe underpin post-modern Europe. One is obviously the legacy of two world wars, something that Kagan with all his talk of 9/11 chooses to ignore. The other is the impact of the Bolshevik revolution and its legacy: the French Revolution, trade unions, political parties of the working class and the left and the eventual rise of social democracy. And just as importantly, Europes colonial history, which has made for connections between the poor world and Europe, that simply do not exist in the US. But I believe the most important factor was Europes response to the Russian Revolution, the Great Depression and the subsequent rise and defeat of Fascism. These events have had an indelible impact on Europe and for the following reasons: Many of the developments of modern European capitalism came about as a response to the challenge of socialism, especially in the post-WWII period. Collectively they include social security, public health, education, housing, transport, energy and massive state intervention in the workings of the capitalist market. All came about as a response to demands from the people and its organisations (trade unions, political parties and civil society) and also because of the fear of a genuine socialist revolution. In addition, it must be added that without massive state intervention, capitalism itself would be in even greater crisis than it is already. And in spite of the attacks mounted by Thatcher and co, it has proved impossible to roll back all of the gains made over the past 75-plus years. So entrenched are these gains, that they form the bedrock not only of Western Europe but even of the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe. These gains are not be lightly dismissed, not simply because they represent material advances but also because they symbolise an ethos, a mindset, that even 50 years of the Cold War, nuclear threats and the subsequent defeat of the Soviet Union could not erase. As has been pointed out on innumerable occasions, the political elites of Europe far from being able to manipulate their citizens live in fear of them, including those in Britain. The vast outpouring of opposition to the invasion of Iraq, numbering in its tens of millions across Europe cannot be dismissed, indeed I argue that it represents yet another expression of just how developed the populations of Europe really are. This is not say that there are no contradictions, far from it. The rise of the right, xenophobia, the fortress Europe mentality and so forth, much of which stems from the policies of European governments, are also part of the political landscape to be reckoned with. However, they do not detract from my basic argument, indeed these remain as issues to be struggled with. My argument doesnt rest on whether or not the populations of Europe are progressive, nor does it rest on the issue of whether or not the political elites are more or less progressive than those of other capitalist states across the world. I maintain that on the one hand, it is the reality of a relatively wealthy and well educated populations whose history has taught them many lessons, lessons that they have not and will not forget, and on the other, capitalist classes and their representatives who have because of the past, not only accumulated vast amounts of capital through colonialism and subsequent industrialisation, but who have no direct interest in imperialist expansion. The power of Europe rests on trade with the world, a vast internal market and technological superiority. Not only that, as I have pointed out before, it also rests on the fact that the elites of Europe, prodded by their citizens as much by enlightened self-interest who have recognised that the future of the biosphere depends on reducing its dependence on a carbon-based technology. And although Europes environmental strategy is uneven and still fraught with contradictions, it firstly responds to the demands of its citizens if at the same time, giving in to the demands of big capital. This is yet another contested terrain. So too, with the battle over genetically modified food, which has all the signs of being yet another parting of the ways with both the US and most probably with the UK (though the jury is still out in Britain). We are also seeing a growing battle over fair trade with the poor countries of the world, a struggle that is organically connected the GM debate (forgive the pun). Again, there are enormous vested interests in European agriculture, so its also contested terrain. In addition to these concrete issues there is the general feeling of malaise which permeates many European states. People are unhappy with their consumer lifestyles, material possessions have ultimately not satisfied their deep felt desires to belong and find meaning in their lives. These are issues that are not to be dismissed lightly, they go to the very root of the reason for living. Discovering purpose and a sense of belonging, especially as many have travelled the world and discovered that in the poor countries, even though people have virtually nothing, nevertheless they belong and are connected both to their communities and to their ancestors. I can attest to this feeling having lived in Africa for the past ten years. This is I believe yet another fault line that separates Europe from the US. Taken collectively, they point to an entirely different path down which European capitalism has been forced to walk. Finally, I contend that all of these developments set the scene for the eventual move toward a socialist Europe. How long this will take or what form, I have no idea, I merely contend that the seeds are present. |
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