National Security Archive Update, July 1, 2005

“Consultation is Presidential Business”
Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974

British Wanted Washington to Consult on Nuclear Weapons Use During Cold War; Worried that U.S. Might Not be “Sober and Responsible”

Declassified Documents Show U.S. Presidents Would Agree to Consultation Only if “Circumstances” Permitted

www.nsarchive.org

For more information contact:
William Burr – 202/994-7032 – wburr@gwu.edu

Washington, D.C., July 1, 2005 – Since late 1950, when British Prime Minister Clement Atlee worried that President Truman might use nuclear weapons in the Korean War, the British government has sought commitments from American presidents that they would not launch nuclear strikes without first consulting London, according to declassified documents posted on the Web today by the National Security Archive.

These U.S. archival records disclose the long history of one of the most sensitive aspects of the historic Anglo-American “special relationship,” which was always treated as a Top Secret item in the official record. While senior U.S. officials like Secretary of State Dean Acheson wanted the British to recognize that they were “sober and responsible” and would not use nuclear weapons unwisely, presidents since Truman have refused to make firm commitments on consultation, instead agreeing to loose understandings. The British accepted this, and for decades have sought to renew and update the understandings whenever a new prime minister or president came into office.

With this electronic briefing book, the National Security Archive publishes for the first time the record of Anglo-American discussions and understandings on nuclear weapons use from Atlee and Truman to Richard Nixon and Edward Heath. The documents, released through Freedom of Information Act requests or identified through archival research, also disclose secret understandings with Canada, West Germany and NATO.

Among the findings:

* The U.S. insistence on escape hatches in the understandings to avoid any limitations on “freedom of action”

* The strict emphasis on keeping the understandings secret so that European members of NATO would not be encouraged to seek agreements

* The 1965 agreement that consultations would extend to nuclear depth bombs stored in the United Kingdom for a Netherlands anti-submarine warfare unit, although the Dutch were kept in the dark about the secret understanding

* The extension of the Anglo-American understanding to U.S. nuclear depth bombs in Bermuda

* Secret U.S. agreements with West Germany to consult on the selective use of nuclear weapons based in Germany

* A secret understanding with NATO reached in 1962

* Secret agreements with Canada on the use of nuclear defensive weapons in Canadian air space and nuclear strikes launched from Canadian bases

Please follow the link below for more on the new documents:

www.nsarchive.org

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