Current developments in the peace process are creating grave concerns that the prospects for disarmament are rapidly being threatened. Everybody knows that the prospects for successful disarmament hinge on the goodwill, better still, the good faith performance of all who have roles to play in the disarmament process. In the wake of the disappointing outcome of the just-ended UN Conference on Assistance to Liberia, and the continued fighting and destruction of lives in central Liberia, questions are being raised as to how well the actors in the disarmament process are playing their various roles. Let us look more closely at this problem:

The Big Three

The first set of actors in the disarmament process is the leaders of the warring factions, particularly the BIG THREE, Boley, Kromah and Taylor. it is beginning to appear that some of the leaders of the warring factions are losing control over their fighters and this is posing a threat to the disarmament process. Developments within the ranks of the NPFL provide the clearest evidence of this loss of command and control. The recent admission by the World Food Program that its convoys were attacked and food destined for orphans in central Liberia were taken by NPFL fighters only underscore the lack of control and the absence of an NPFL-organized system for caring for its fighters. Then there were the reports of internal fighting within the NPFL in Totota and Sergeant Kollie Town (SKT), and the death of scores of innocent people who tried to flee. (One report stated that as many as 25 people, mostly children, drowned in the Baar-lang creek which divides SKT from Suacoco). Phebe hospital, the nerve center of healh care to all of central and northern Liberia, has been raided. All this in the last two weeks, after the Tappita massacre and the fighting that took place in Gbarnga.

Perhaps similar developments are taking place within the ranks of other warring factions but have yet to be brought to light. What is sure is that if the leaders of other warring factions do not move swiftly to assist ECOMOG deploy and undertake disarmament, chaos will develop within their ranks also. The breakdown of command and control will become common to all warring factions. What makes all of this very dangerous is that when chaos develops, there is a tendency not to want to admit that there is a loss of control. Such admission could only serve to ensure support of everybody else, including ECOMOG, in helping to solve the problem. It is true that the leaders of warring factions now live in Monrovia and have not been able to satisfy all the expectations of their fighters and followers—and this may be a source of the breakdown of command and control. But the answer to the problem is not to do anything about it themselves. Boley, Kromah and Taylor must be seen to be taking charge of the situation as leaders of warring factions and finding solutions. Their appeal to the international community is not the best they can do. They must show leadership in the disarmament process and be seen to be doing so. They must go to their strongholds, hold meetings with their top level fighters, issue orders and let the rest of us know that they are taking steps. Where the problem is beyond their control-and it seems to be rapidly becoming so-they must put a courageous stop to their internal bickering (especially the brinkmanship now going on between Kromah and Taylor), put together those forces that are still loyal to each of them, and make a major effort to stop the chaos which continues in the heartland of Liberia. THEY MUST SHOW LEADERSHIP BY ACTION.

Calls have been made in various quarters for ECOMOG to move in where leaders of warring factions have lost control. The mandate of ECOMOG does not call for its intervention in such matters when the leaders of warring factions themselves have not even admitted to having a problem and submitting that problem to the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee. Besides, it should be troubling and unacceptable for the leader of any warring faction to sit supinely in Monrovia without making concrete efforts to bring his fighters under control and further the disarmament process, and yet expect ECOMOG to thrust itself amid hostile forces in territories that are supposed to be under his control. We urge the big three to take control or reassert control over their men and: take bold steps; individual steps, if necessary, for disarmament.

The Council of State

The second set of actors in the disarmament process is the Council of State. The Council of State is the collective leadership of government. It must lead on the most important issue in our country. It must have a policy on the disarmament process and that policy must contain more than the issuance of international appeals for help. What is the government itself prepared to do to move forward the disarmament process? What is its strategy to do what it thinks should be done? What does it want the Liberian people to do to aid the disarmament process? Disarmament is the key to peace; it must be the principal concern of the government as it is of the people.

Despite the loud and often uncoordinated appeal to the international community by members of the Council of State, international support for disarmament has fallen far short of what was expected. Why is this the case? This is the case partly because the government itself, under the leadership of the Council of State which, in turn, is effectively led by the leaders of the three major warring factions, has not demonstrated a commitment to disarmament. The government has to demonstrate its commitment by formulating a clear policy as to how it and the Liberian people can help raise the resources required for disarmament. It has not even offered a word of encouragement to Liberians who are trying to raise money to help the disarmament process, let alone make its own contribution to the international fund raising effort. Instead, it has depleted the funds it met in the coffers.

The members of the Council of State continue to preside over territory with resources. The Council must be able to demonstrate its commitment to support the disarmament process by bringing to the national coffers the resources of the country which are now flowing through the brisk informal economy which is operating in the territories still under the control of the leaders of the warring factions, especially the big three. What prevents the Council of State that includes Messrs Boley, Kromah and Taylor from organizing a strategy that will ensure that the gold and diamonds taken from areas under the control of these councilmen are marketed through the formal economy so that, minimally, government taxes are collected? (Vice Chairman Kromah has been the only member of the Council to hint a preparedness to move in this direction. But he must move swiftly and set the example).

Better still, what prevents the COS from temporarily taking control of these mining areas and selling the gold and diamonds on the international market to help finance the disarmament and demobilization programs? The same could be said for other resources. Everybody knows that extensive mining and logging are going on in areas under the control of some of the leaders of warring factions. Why does the Council of State not insist on controlling the export of those resources? Why does the Council continue to shift its responsibility to others? IT MUST SHOW LEADERSHIP BY ACTION.

We are informed that after having called for international support and demanded participation as co-convener of the Pledging Conference, the government was conspicuously absent from the technical session at which the details of the pledges for disarmament were discussed. Government representatives did not attend the technical session that considered pledges for humanitarian issues. Failure to participate in the technical discussions on disarmament pledges deprived the government of an opportunity to seek clarification and, possibly, adjustments in the pledges. Perhaps it may have been possible to negotiate a reconfiguration of the various components of the pledges so as to give a larger share to ECOMOG for disarmament. Could not China, Thailand, and other rice producing countries of the Far East be asked to contribute to food relief, thereby reducing US participation in food assistance and freeing up a greater portion of the US package of $75 million for support for disarmament? The Council’s demand for participation in the meeting should have been followed by a demand for involvement in planning of strategies and approaches to donors, and creative participation in negotiations.

ECOWAS

ECOWAS and ECOMOG constitute the third set of actors in the disarmament process. ECOWAS too must share the blame for the disappointing outcome of the Pledge Conference. The greatest error being made by ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict is its shyness to acknowledge and proclaim that it is successfully undertaking an exercise in sub-regional conflict resolution which is path-breaking in contemporary world history. This fete has to be properly acknowledged within the ranks of ECOWAS itself, and then sold to the wider international community. Let us face it: a formula for the resolution of sub- regional conflict that involves the sub-regional authorities as the core, assisted by regional and international forces is a novel formula. Moreover, every measure taken by ECOWAS/ECOMOG to resolve the conflict in Liberia-including those measures that were initially criticized by the western powers are now being copied in the efforts to resolve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

Why is ECOWAS not totally effective in selling the case for assistance to ECOMOG for the disarmament process in Liberia? Part of the problem has already been discussed in the lack of effort on the part of the Liberian warring factions and the LNTG itself. But beside these, we must admit that the international appeal spearheaded by Chairman Rawlings has not been totally successful. Perhaps the role of the secretariat of ECOWAS in this undertaking needs to be examined. The long delay in appointing a political officer, a direct representative of the Chairman or the Executive Secretary may have also contributed to the groundwork not been properly done. With the leaders of all warring factions on board, and the Ivorian elections over, why have we not pressed the Ivorians for a definite committment-not simply an expression of intention to contribute? Why are we not hearing from the Burkinabe? What is the Libyan contribution to disarmament? We are told that Tripoli wants to normalize relations with Liberia. A good pace to start is to help us clear out the arms which now infest our society. Libya and Burkina Faso have an obligation to help us get the arms out of our country. This is their moral obligation. If they are not prepared to stand up now to this obligation, they must not show up tomorrow with platitudes of friendship and comradeship. Why is our Council of State not successful in driving home this message? Why is Chairman Rawlings not successful in getting these two countries to assist substantially with disarmment?

We are also uneasy with the attitude of the British: At a time when every effort is being made within ECOWAS to emphasize the unity of the peace initiative in Liberia, why athe British singling out Ghana for a sun of US$75,000 for communications equipment exclusively for a new battalion to be sent to Liberia? Chairman Rawlings must discourage this gesture and explain to the British that such gestures can only undermine the solidarity which is so important for the effectiveness and success of ECOMOG. When the United States started this discriminatory practice by providing special facilities for the Senegalese in ECOMOG, both IGNU and ECOWAS should have expressed concern. They did not. That silence later led to vastly discriminating treatment by the UN in favor of the Ugandan and Tanzanian forces, and has now led the British to feel that such practice is acceptable. It should not be.

What about the French? We are informed that the French have pledged US$3 million. We believe that the French should be prepared to do better in view of the large amount of money that French businessmen have made from Liberian logs illegally taken out of our country during the war. However, even in making a pledge of three million, the French have remained cagy, and the details of their pledge unclear. Is this money available to ECOMOG directly for disarmament? Why do the French need an “independent” French assessment over and above what the UN has already made? The fact of the matter is that the French have not been innocent bystanders in the Liberian conflict and should now help substantially. The LNTG and Chairman Rawlings should press them to be more forthcoming to do much better.

Then there are the Chinese.

China is a member of the Security Council and is already in the middle of a diplomatic squabble with the Taiwanese in Liberia. It is up to the Chinese as a member of the Security Council and a friend of Liberia to make a contribution to disarmament. All of Liberia’s friends should be informed that it is not good enough to wait until disarmament has taken place in order to develop a basis for cooperation. Without question, Liberia’s economic recovery will, by necessity, involve considerable foreign input, but that foreign input will most effectively be mobilized through incentives for foreign participation in private sector ventures, not through outright foreign grants. Now is the time to show goodwill if partnership in economic ventures is to be expected tomorrow. Those countries that are not prepared to help with disarmament must not be given preferences for participation in private sector ventures later. In fact this principle should become an element in our national recovery policy. And this principle should be included in our strategy as we hold discussion with the international community to make up the shortfall in the funding of disarmament and demobilization.

With all due respect to ECOWAS, we believe that our illustrious Chairman of ECOWAS and the Secretariat of ECOWAS should have sat together with experts from other ECOMOG contributing countries and the Liberian government and properly plan a strategy as to how best to tap international sources. This was not done. Now that we have a substantial shortfall, there is still a need for proper planning as to how to make up the shortfall.

The United States

The United States has to be considered an important actor with respect to assistance to the disarmament process. The pledge of the United States at the Pledging Conference was most disappointing, perhaps only as disappointing as that of the COS’ lack of proper coordination of the approach to the conference. It is now known that the pledge of US$75 million contains very little new money, since close to US$50 million of it is money already committed to food relief through the World Food Program and Catholic Relief Services. Liberians are always grateful for American humanitarian assistance, particularly since that assistance ($440 million) and US assistance to ECOMOG (US$60 million) as of 1990, now stands at about US$500 million. By any standards, a commitment of half a billion dollars of anybody’s money to meet the human and peacekeeping needs of Liberians must be acknowledged with appreciation. (Nigeria has put at least US$3 billion into the Liberian peace process.) However, the United States is also no innocent bystander in the Liberian conflict. it stood shoulder to shoulder with successive undemocratic Liberian governments that got us into this tragedy. It benefited considerably from Liberia’s junior-partnership relationship during the cold war. It therefore now has no moral option but to help get Liberia out of this crisis. And the provision of US$10 million for disarmament is plainly not enough. The United States must do more!

What is also troubling are the views of the United States with respect to the deployment of ECOMOG. The United States seems to be suggesting that ECOMOG should be more concerned with deploying where there is fighting at the moment, and perhaps later, worry about the rest of the country. This “fire fighting” approach may have its drawbacks. What happens if intensive fighting breaks out elsewhere? Everyone knows what happened in 1992 when ECOMOG deployed haphazardly. If ECOMOG is to take risk for peace in Liberia, Liberia’s oldest friend must show greater support for ECOMOG. One wonders whether the United States held prior discussion with ECOMOG on this approach?

All those responsible for the deployment of ECOMOG insist that to do an effective job under the circumstances, ECOM0G needs 18,000 men; or a minimum of 12,000. The United States now insists that ECOMOG can begin the job with its current force of under 6,000 men. On what is the US basing its position? Has this position been harmonized with ECOWAS, especially since the United States is in close touch with Chairman Rawlings? If so, do we take it that the contribution of US$10million to ECOMOG for disarmament is an initial contribution, and that more is to come?

The United Nations

The role of the United Nations in the mobilization of resources for disarmament is sometimes confusing. We were initially told that the purpose of the Pledging Conference was to raise funds to support ECOMOG and UNOMIL in their work for disarmament and demobilization. We were also told that UNOMIL needed somewhere between US$50 or US$60 million and ECOMOG needed about US$90 million. This is how the figure of US$150 million was arrived at. What went wrong? How could a UN organized conference designed to raise money for disarmament and demobilization end up receiving so little for its purpose but greatly succeed in getting pledgers to reaffirm their commitment to continuing their support for food assistance and other things which were not supposed to be the major items on the agenda? How come the Special Representative of the Secretary General to Liberia, the person who is the chief coordinator of UN activities in Liberia, was not present al the Pledge Conference? In his absence, who was advising the Secretary eneral? We are told that budgetary constraints prevented the attendance of the Special Representative. Frankly, we find that unacceptable. Ambassador Nyaki has shown considerable understanding of the Liberian conflict, sound familiarization with the principal players and, above all, great empathy with the Liberian people. His presence in New York would have been an asset. He should have been there.

The Liberian People

Finally, the Liberian people must share the blame for the disappointing outcome of the Pledge Conference for disarmament. As much as Liberians have accepted the fact that disarmament is the key to peace, they have not used their energies and creativity to work hard enough for disarmament. At this juncture in the Liberian crisis, every civic, religious, social, and cultural organization, every economic entity should have asked itself; what can we do to promote disarmament? Programs and projects should by now be organized by every group around the answer to this question; and those programs and projects should constitute the major preoccupation of the day. Sadly, this has not been the case. Liberians today are showing more gusto in the scramble for seats in the TLA than they are showing in their concern about disarmament. Our attitudes, actions, and utterances sometimes seem to suggest that simply with ECOMOG’s presence, disarmament is a fait accompli. Disarmament will only take place if we work for it. ECOMOG can only be effective in helping us achieve disarmament if we help ECOMOG.

The poor outcome of the Pledge Conference has underscored the need for effective cooperation among the major entities whose involvement will make for successful disarmament. These are the Liberian people and their government, ECOWAS and ECOMOG, and the international community in which the United States and the United Nations are the driving forces. An integrated strategy involving the inputs of all these players has to be formulated and each group could efficiently play its role in the implementation of the initiative. We must learn some lessons from the Pledge Conference and benefit from our mistakes. The stakes with respect to disarmament are much too high to have us engage in the self-deception of putting a favorable spin on an obvious disappointment.